Book Reviews by unknown
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 24 
Issue 2 April 1959 Article 6 
1959 
Book Reviews 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Book Reviews , 24 MO. L. REV. (1959) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss2/6 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School 
of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Book Reviews
EARLY ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE. By Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett, F.B.A,, Hon.
Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, Professor of Legal History in the
University of London.* Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,
1958. Pp. viii, 120. 18 s. 6 d.; $3.75.
Professor Plucknett is best known in this country for his studies of English
legal history per se.1 He deserves to be equally well known here for his valuable
monographs in historical materials from which "the pure history of legal doctrine is
significantly and properly absent."2 These are intended for students of legal history
who wish to go to the sources, designed to teach not so much the content of the
old books as how to read, understand and evaluate them in the light of the setting
in which and purpose for which they were written. They have dealt with mediaeval
statutes,3 the Year Books,4 'the earliest modern case reports5 and with old law books
intended for the education of students and practitioners. 6 The present work is a
study of non-statutory books published in the twelfth through the fifteenth centuries.
It is longer, more perfect, and designed for a more mature reader, than Sir William
Holdsworth's treatment of this literature. 7
To the law teacher who is struggling to establish or maintain a course in legal
history against the apathy and utilitarian emphasis of students, administration and
organized bar the first chapters seems at first to be a manifesto of class treason. It
*Professor Plucknett is Dean of the Faculty of Laws of the University of London
and Literary Director of the Selden Society.
1. Notably, A CONCISE HISTORY OF TiH CoMnON LAW (5th ed. 1956); Professor
Plucknett is the author of a monograph on THE MEDIEVAL BAILIFF (1954), editor of
TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (10th ed. 1946), and co-editor
of POUND AND PLUCKNETT, READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COaMON LAW
(3d ed. 1927). He has published numerous articles and reviews on English legal
history and biography.
2. Plucknett, Book Review, 26 COLumn. L. REv. 1052, 1053 (1926).
3. STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH
CENTURY (Cambridge 1922); LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I (Oxford 1949).
4. E.g., Introduction to the YEARBOoKS OF RICHARD 11: 13 RICHARD II (Ames
Foundation 1929); Introductions to the YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, vol. X (Selden
Society vol. 63, 1947), vol. XXIII (Selden Society vol. 65, 1950), vol. XXIV (Selden
Society vol. 70, 1953).
5. Plucknett, The Genesis of Coke's Reports, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 190 (1942).
6. E.g., Plucknett, The Harvard Manuscript of Thornton's Summa, 51 HARV. L.
REV. 1038 (1938); Plucknett, Ellesmere on Statutes, 60 LAW Q. REV. 242 (1944);
Preface to BRaviA PLACIrATA (Selden Society vol. 66, 1951).
7. SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH LAW 23-36, 78-89 (Oxford 1925). Much
of this was based on 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY O ENGLISH LAW (1909; 4th ed. 1936).
Cf. WINFIE D, CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 145-83, 256-85 (1925).
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declares that knowledge of legal history is unnecessary to success as a lawyer.9
The key to this initially astonishing depreciation of his own field is to be found in
Professor Plucknett's remark of thirty years ago, "The common law has always
been inclined to rely upon a conventionalised version of history which had among
its many conveniences immunity from questioning, at least within the profes-
sion..... ."1o He, in common with Professor Maitland, believes that what the practising
lawyer needs to know is not what actually happened in history but what the
authoritative pronouncements of the courts declare happened.1 What Sir Edward
Coke wrote about the meaning of a thirteenth century charter may be historically
inaccurate but if his version has been accepted by the courts, it is, in this view, all
a lawyer need know to win cases. Even if the dichotomy of actual history and
authoritative dogma is understood and accepted the view that knowledge of the
former is not needed by the practising lawyer is, to say the least, questionable.
Knowledge of the actual historical development of legal doctrines may be a surer
key to forecasting future development than knowledge of the official view of the
past. Moreover, the authoritative view may be changed if its falsity is uncon-
trovertibly established, as was brilliantly demonstrated by Horace Binney in the
Girard College Case.'2 Professor Plucknett has enthusiasm for. the cultural value of
legal history to the lawyer;13 he places too low an estimate on its utility to him.
The next three chapters are devoted to writers, notably Glanvill and Bracton,
who sought to lay down substantive English law in authoritative treatises, similar
in form to Continental works, for a legal profession which was at home in Latin
and familiar with civil and canon law. The earliest of these, in the effort to ground
their works on authority like that which the Continental writers found in imperial
legislation and papal decretals, unwisely relied upon codes of Anglo-Saxon kings.
Glanvill and Bracton properly founded theirs upon the actual practise of the English
royal courts and, in doing so, necessarily changed the organization of the subject
matter from a basis of types of rights to one of types of remedies. The treatment of
Bracton constitutes a warning, especially valuable to lawyers not trained in historical
method, against assuming that the presently available form of an ancient work
corresponds to the original. That Bracton in print suffers from omissions and inter-
polations has long been known. Certain errors, notably in Roman law, occur in
the earliest manuscripts, which fact has led to inferences that (1) Bracton's knowl-
edge of Roman law was deficient or, in the alternative, that (2) all the manuscripts
derive from one made after Bracton's death by a redactor who garbled the text.
9. PLUcKNETT, EARLY ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE 13, 17, 18 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as PLUCKNETr].
10. Plucknett, Book Review, 28 COLUm. L. Rsv. 676 (1928).
11. PLucxNET 11-12, 17.
12. In The Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 1 (1819), it was held, on the ground that charitable trusts were
not enforcible in England prior to the Statute of Charitable Uses (1601), that a
charitable trust could not be created in a state which had repealed that statute. By
showing that this ground was historically false, Binney induced the Court to over-
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Professor Plucknett suggests a third theory, understandable to the modem man of
affairs who stamps "dictated but not read" on his letters, that the author dictated
his work to clerks over a period of years but never found time in which to check
the accuracy of their transcriptions.
The final chapters deal with literature written for a new type of legal profession
which developed in the latter part of the thirteenth century, French-speaking laymen,
inadept at Latin and unfamiliar with the civil and canon law, whose main interest
was in oral pleading and whose knowledge of both substantive and procedural law
was derived chiefly through oral transmission of tradition in the Inns of Court
and the courts. This literature included form books for writs and pleadings,
catechisms to be memorized by students, and the Year Books, all of which tended
to neglect substantive law, the formulation of general legal principles and logical
organization of the subject matter, in their concentration on original writs and
oral pleading. Professor Plucknett thinks that the Year Books were not really
reports of cases looked upon as precedents but primarily samples of oral pleading
used by the law student or lawyer to improve his court-room technique. He points
out that their form tends to be that of a dialogue, that they often omit mention of
the decision, that the greatest demand was for those with the best examples of
pleading rather than those with the newest cases, and that their popularity declined
with the advent of written pleadings in the fifteenth century.
This book is not recommended for the lawyer whose interests are limited to
winning cases and collecting fees. It will prove interesting but not essential to the
lawyer who is content to learn legal history from the pages of Maitland and Holds-
worth. It will be treasured by the lawyer who delights in puzzling his way through
folios of blackletter text in Law French, the record of words which echoed against
the walls of Westminster Hall half a millennium ago.
WILLIAM F. FRATCHER*
THE FRENCn LEGAL SYSTMa: An Introduction to Civil Law Systems. By Rene' David
and Henry P. de Vries. New York: Oceana Publications for Parker School of
Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University, 1958. Pp. 152. $5.00.
This small but interesting book, jointly authored by two comparative law scholars,
a Frenchman and an American, claims by its subtitle to serve as an introduction to
civil law systems, but does not define what "civil law," if not used to refer to "private
law," but to distinguish it from Anglo-American law, means. "Civil law" in this
application of the term, does not mean Roman law, or Roman law as restated in
Justinian's Corpus Juris, although an erroneous definition to this effect has been
given by Blackstone] and from his Commentaries been taken over into certain
current reference works. 2 Incidentally, the "Regius Professor of Civil Law" at the
University of Oxford in England teaches Roman law, not civil law. The latter though
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri; A.B., Wayne University, 1933, A.M.,
1938; J.D., University of Michigan, 1936, LL.M., 1951, S.J.D., 1952.
1. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *80.
2. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 312 (4th ed. 1951); BALLENTINE, LAw DICTIONARY 219
(2d ed. 1948); 14 C.J.S. Civil 115 (1939).
[Vol. 24
3
et al.: Book Reviews
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1959
BOOK REVIEWS
to a great extent an intellectual child of the Roman law, received substantial
graftings from Germanic, Canonic, and other non-Roman sources, so that there are
some differences between Roman law and the modem civil law, although this has
been overstated in an observation by two distinguished English authors that "there
is more affinity between the Roman jurist and the common lawyer than there is
between the Roman jurist and his modem civilian successor."3 For instance, the
comparative negligence doctrine of the civil law, which has been adopted in England4
and certain other common law jurisdictions, 5 is not of Roman law origin.6 The
conception of civil law is difficult to define. This writer has on another occasion
attempted to describe its meaning in an exact way.7 Among the countries which
belong to the civil law family are, apart from numerous others, France, Germany,
Italy, Switzerland, Spain, The Netherlands, the Union of South Africa, and the
South American countries. There are also certain legal systems which in addition
to a civil law basis contain substantial admixtures of common law features. Such
hybrids are, for example, the law of Scotland 8 and the law of Louisiana. 9
The present book, despite its subtitle, does not purport to deal with the civil
law system in the broad meaning of that term. It deals only with French law
although the authors admit that there are essential differences between the legal
system of France and those of other civil law countries. 10 They believe, however,
that "the French legal system, especially for the professional trained in the common
law, serves as the nearest and most direct bridge to the civil law world." 11 They
do not attempt to convey to their readers knowledge of the rules constituting in
their aggregate the law of France; they merely undertake to give some information
on the French "habits of legal thinking."12 The book mostly consists of comparative
law observations on a high level of generality, considering, however, not only
the French private law, but all branches of the French law. While those observations
are most interesting and thought-provoking, it would seem to the reviewer that they
can be fully grasped only by a reader who has at least a fair knowledge of those
concrete matters in the French law to which the authors allude in an abstract way.
And, being purely textual, the book is completely different in approach from the
3. BUCKLAND & McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND ColAmoN LAW XIV (2d ed. Lawson
1952).
4. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28.
5. PRossER, SELEcTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 3 (1953).
6. BucKE.xD & McNAm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 372.
7. Koessler, Book Review, 10 STAN. L. REv. 385, 388 (1958).
8. Gibb, The Inter-Relation of the Legal Systems of Scotland and England, 53
L.Q. REv. 61 (1937).
9. Tucker, The Code and the Common Law in Louisiana, in THE CODE NAPOLEON
AND THE Co~mroN LAW WORLD 346, 371 (Schwartz ed. 1956).
10. DAVID & DE VRss, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYsTEm: An Introduction to Civil Law
Systems 6 (1958).
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 5.
1959]
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two compendious cases-and-materials books on the civil law system that have been
published in this country.' 3 It is believed, however, that it may well serve as a
supplementary aid in comparative law courses on the civil law system.
MAXIMILIAN KOEsSLER*
THE GOOD SocI=TY. By Hugh Evander Willis. New York: Vantage Press, 1958. Pp.
642. $7.50.
The author of this book is a legal educator emeritus who by law review articles
and books has made noteworthy contributions to the legal literature. His present
interest seems, however, to be concentrated on divinity, ethics, sociology, politics,
and similar non-legal matters. At any rate, what he offers in this book only incident-
ally deals with legal material, and only in so far as it surveys the principles espoused
by the United States Supreme Court in its constitutional decisions. He believes that
the Supreme Court has thus created, and not merely construed, our Constitution.
And he is enthusiastically laudatory of those constitutional decisions, whereas he
is an acrimonious and passionate critic of other parts of our society, especially of its
educational system, its alleged control by big capital and the alleged evil effects
thereof, its alleged failure to live up to what is ordained by our Constitution, and
its allegedly disastrous cold war policy. While he seems to be a firm believer in God,
thus approaching his subject from a completely different angle than does Julian
Huxley in his most interesting RELIGION WITHOuT REVELATION, 1 he sharply attacks
the established churches, claiming that they do not teach the religion "of Christ,"
but a religion "about Christ," and that this is due to an essential difference between
what the founder of Christianity stood for and the transformation which his gospel
received from St. Paul and those who followed St. Paul. He is not only critical,
however, but develops also his partly realistic, partly over-theoretical ideas on
how our system could be so changed as to become a "Good Society," which according
to him, it has not been so far. His" main assumption in this respect, not expressed
but implied in his discussion, is substantially different from Dante's "Hell is paved
with good intentions." He obviously assumes that enlightening the people about the
righteous principles will have the effect of causing them to live up to those ideals,
an assumption which at least borders on that, if it is not, utopian. Also in other
respects the author does not always tread on solid ground, and he most conspicuously
does not supply any documentation for his propositions, which thus rest on his
own authority. Actually the book is written down to the reader, and sometimes
sounds like a "return to Christ" sermon of a Billy Graham. One of his a priori
13. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW (1941); VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM
(1957).
*Member of the California and New York Bars.
1. "I have called this book Religion Without Revelation to express at the out-
set my conviction that religion of the highest and fullest character can co-exist with
a complete absence of belief in revelation in any straight forward sense of the word,
and of belief in that kernel of revealed religion, a personal god." HuXLEY, Religion
Without Revelation, 13 (Mentor Book ed. 1958).
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assumptions is that the God of the Holy Scriptures predestined only the physical
being of man, but left man unbridled freedom of choice and unlimited self-respon-
sibility as to moral development. It is with this in mind that he sets forth what
he believes is fundamentally wrong with us Americans.
By "Good Society" he actually means the ideal of a democracy which he
believes could become a reality if we would live up to the principles announced
in the Sermon on the Mount and those inherent in the constitutional decisions
of our Supreme Court. In a festival speech delivered on February 12, 1959 before
a joint session of both houses of Congress, our great poet and historian, Carl Sand-
burg, said with regard to Abraham Lincoln: "Democracy? We can't find words to
say exactly what it is, but he had it. In his blood and bones he carried it. In the
breath of his speeches and writings, it is there. He had the idea. It's there in the
lights and shadows of his personality, a mystery that can be lived but never fully
spoken in words."2 That the author of this book has the courage of attempting to
solve that "mystery" of democracy which according to Sandburg "can be lived but
never fully spoken in words," and that he does this in a highly dogmatic way, he
cannot be blamed for, as he cannot be blamed for the far from detached, rather
strongly emotional manner in which he professes his political creeds. Nor, as he
writes with the honest idealism of one believing that proper ideas about democracy
are an efficacious means of establishing a good democracy, or a "Good Society,"
as he calls it,3 should he be branded as an "egghead" ignoring the reality of things.
And his book is full of interesting and inspiring thoughts. But it would have been
better than it is, and more effective, had he not indulged in a strongly longwinded
and frequently repetitious manner of discussion, rather had made his propositions
in a more condensed form.
MAx==ax KOESSLER*
2. As reported by Russell Baker of New York Times Services, printed in San
Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 13, 1959.
3. Compare the following words which a famous British writer of mystery
stories puts into the mouth of the main character of one of them: "Mind you, I still
believe in democracy. But you've got to force it on people with a strong hand-ram
it down their throats.... You won't turn people into angels by appealing to their
better natures just yet awhile, but by judicious force you can coerce them into
behaving more or less decently to one another. . . .Evolution is a slow process."
CHRISTIE, The Secret of Chimneys 218 (New Dell ed. 1959). Quaere: Are the diffi-
culties standing in the way of enforcement of the desegregation rulings of the United
States Supreme Court an object lesson of the foregoing?
*Member of the California and New York Bars.
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